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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LITTLE ROCK AND THE LEGACY OF DRED SCOTT
john a. powell* AND STEPHEN MENENDIAN**

INTRODUCTION
In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its celebrated
decision in Brown v. Board of Education declaring that the doctrine of
“separate but equal” announced in Plessy v. Ferguson1 was thereafter
unconstitutional.2 In spite of this ringing pronouncement, Southern school
boards were slow to take up the task of disestablishing state mandated racial
segregation. Little Rock, Arkansas, was no exception.
In 1957, the Little Rock School District announced a gradual plan of
integration.3 Integration was to begin in the 1957–1958 school year at the
senior high school level and trickle downward, although no target dates were
set for further integration.4 Most critically, the plan allowed only a handful of
Black students to attend White schools.5
When local leaders and
representatives of the NAACP were unable to convince the school district to
implement a more expansive integration plan, they filed a lawsuit in U.S.
district court styled Aaron v. Cooper on behalf of the parents of thirty-three
Black children.6 The district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the integration plan devised by the school board was reasonable.7
Rather than pursue further appeals, the plaintiffs began to work with the school

* john a. powell is the Williams Chair in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Moritz College of Law,
the Ohio State University and Executive Director, Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and
Ethnicity, the Ohio State University.
** Stephen Menendian is an attorney and legal research associate at the Kirwan Institute.
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Judge Wiley Branton, Jr., A Date with History: Wiley A. Branton and the Path to Cooper
v. Aaron, 42 ARK. LAW. 20, 22 (2007).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 22–24.
7. Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855, 866 (E.D. Ark. 1956), aff’d, 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir.
1957).
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district to identify Black students who could enter Central High at the start of
the school year.8
Out of two hundred initially eligible candidates, only nine Black students,
with the consent of their parents, were willing to integrate Central High.9
These nine brave children were harassed, threatened, and subjected to various
reprisals.10 On September 2, 1957, Governor Orval Faubus dispatched the
Arkansas National Guard to surround Central High to prevent the Little Rock
Nine from entering the school.11 Two days later, the Little Rock Nine were
barred from entering Central High School.12 After a request from the U.S.
Justice Department, the district court enjoined the governor and the Guard
from “preventing the attendance of Negro children at Central High School.”13
Although the governor withdrew the National Guard, he had successfully
moved the public to join in defiance.14 Hundreds of protestors, mostly White
parents, stood in front of the schools screaming and yelling epithets.15
On September 25, 1957, President Eisenhower dispatched federal troops to
ensure compliance with the federal court order.16 The plaintiffs and the school
board ratcheted up the legal battle until the Supreme Court issued its ruling,
Cooper v. Aaron, on September 12, 1958.17 In its decision, the Supreme Court
unanimously reaffirmed Brown and declared that the U.S. Constitution was
absolutely controlling and binding on state officials in spite of any state law or
state action to the contrary.18
This symposium on Cooper v. Aaron19 commemorates the fiftieth
anniversary of the Supreme Court’s intervention in the Little Rock crisis. The
symposium speakers, including the keynote speaker, underscored the ways in
which the Little Rock crisis formed a critical juncture on the path to fulfilling
the promise of Brown.20 Little Rock was a turning point in public support for
integration, exposing through the malevolence and terror, threatened and
8. Branton, supra note 3, at 24.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Branton, supra note 3, at 24 (citing Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (1957)).
14. Id.
15. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 237 F. Supp. 2d 988,
998 (E.D.Ark. 2002) (noting that the nine students entered Central High School despite “the
threatening mob of whites”).
16. Id.
17. See Branton, supra note 3, at 24–25 (discussing the school district’s request for a delay
in further implementation of the plan on account of the preceding events).
18. Id. at 25 (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1958)).
19. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
20. David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065
(2008).
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exacted, on nine teenagers the severity of Jim Crow segregation. As important
as Cooper may be on the path from Brown, the stream of law that flows out of
Brown did not originate there. Nor does the exercise of judicial authority in
Cooper pertain solely to the issues raised in Brown. Viewing Cooper from the
trajectory of Brown conveys an incomplete picture of the Supreme Court’s
intervention in Little Rock. Brown is but one element of a greater
jurisprudential whole, of which Cooper speaks directly upon.
In this Article we suggest that understanding the full significance of the
Supreme Court’s intervention in Cooper requires us to go back further than
Brown or even Plessy. We must situate Cooper v. Aaron in the context of
another constitutional crisis and its ultimate resolution. As we reflect upon the
fiftieth anniversary of the Little Rock Nine and the subsequent Supreme Court
decision, we must also reflect upon another anniversary, the one hundred and
fiftieth anniversary of the notorious Dred Scott 21 decision. Many of the
fundamental issues raised in Cooper hark back to the Civil War. In some ways
we are still negotiating the outcome, at least the outcome of the resolution, of
that great conflict. The principal recognition accorded the Dred Scott case in
the American mythos is its role in “precipitating” the Civil War.22
Undoubtedly, the decision aggravated a bitter, long-standing sectional conflict.
In order to fully understand the transformation wrought by the Civil War and
its aftermath, we must return to Dred Scott. The Dred Scott case serves as a
focal point, speaking to the elemental questions of citizenship, membership,
and American identity and community that frame the contested resolution of
the Civil War through the Reconstruction Amendments. In Cooper, even more
so than Brown, we reach a judicial apogee, with the Court striving to reclaim
the slumbering spiritual commitments of the Reconstruction Amendments.
In Part I, we sketch the contours of the Dred Scott opinion and examine the
race line Chief Justice Taney inscribed into the definition of American
citizenship by announcing that persons of African descent, regardless of their
status, could never become American citizens. In a modern democratic state,
citizenship is the fundamental form of membership in society. As the
expositor of the Constitution, the Supreme Court played a symbolic role in
shaping American identity by helping constitute and reaffirm a racialized
understanding of American citizenship.

21. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
22. For a thoughtful discussion on whether Dred Scott helped “precipitate” the Civil War,
see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS 561–67 (1978). Fehrenbacher concludes that the Dred Scott decision is better
understood as a “conspicuous and perhaps an integral part of a configuration of events and
conditions that did produce enough changes of allegiance to make a political revolution and
enough intensity of feeling to make that revolution violent.” Id. at 561.
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Part II examines the work of the Reconstruction Amendments and their
relationship to Dred Scott. The Reconstruction Amendments were a sustained
attempt to reverse Dred Scott and sweep former slaves into the political
community, both as a matter of law, but also as a matter of social and political
fact. In the process, the Reconstruction Amendments redefined and reordered
the relationship between the national government and the states, with
implications for the meaning of national citizenship. The post-Reconstruction
Supreme Court systematically reversed much of this work in a trio of decisions
that hollowed out the Fourteenth Amendment, with practical and
jurisprudential consequences that are evident today.
Part III ties the debate over the meaning of the Reconstruction
Amendments to the symbolic impact of the Supreme Court’s intervention in
Cooper and beyond. Cooper is more than a reaffirmation of the principles in
Brown, it is also a statement about the limits of individual choice in a
democratic community. The Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil War
itself rejected the claim by the White community of a right to secede from
communal relations. The continuing struggle over voluntary school integration
plans and the de jure/de facto divide is the most recent iteration of this debate.
Part IV describes the resegregation trends in American society and will
pick up the thread of integration and citizenship in the debate in Parents
Involved. Five decades after Brown, schools are resegregating along racial
lines. At a time of growing international dependence when the United States is
increasingly multi-racial, our society is fragmenting. There is a revived debate
over the importance of integration, with many feeling integration exhaustion.
Integration, as we have known it, has been misconceived. It is not about how
well students learn or test scores, it is primarily about citizenship and how
students perceive themselves and their community and the values that an
integrated education fosters.
I. SHADOW OF DRED SCOTT
There are perhaps few, if any, Supreme Court cases in American
constitutional history that have the scope of purview and breadth of implication
as Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott. Substantively, the opinion of
the Chief Justice addresses issues as wide-ranging and important as the
relationship between the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation, the
geographic extent of the Bill of Rights, the limit of congressional power, the
constitutional basis for territorial expansion, comity between the states, the
nature of the Federal Union, and the rights of private property.23 The opinion
of the Chief Justice also defined the legal status of Indian tribes, the power of
naturalization, and clarified the meaning and criteria of citizenship both state

23. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 6.
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and national.24 The Dred Scott opinions themselves add up to nearly 240
pages.25 To say that this case is long and complex is a hyperbolic
understatement. It was only the second case in American history to overturn
an act of Congress and the first to overturn a major congressional act.26 In
some respects, its zealous assertion of judicial review is as important as
Marbury v. Madison.27
Although there remain lingering questions about their historical accuracy,28
the facts can be summarized as follows: Peter Blow, a native of Virginia, gave
up farming in Alabama and moved his family and six slaves to St. Louis in
1830 to operate a boarding house known as the Jefferson Hotel.29 The
boarding house was unsuccessful and his health and the health of his family
deteriorated with his business.30 Some time between 1830 and 1833, the estate
of Peter Blow sold Dred Scott to Dr. John Emerson, a medical officer at the
nearby barracks. 31 In December 1833, Emerson was appointed assistant
surgeon in the U.S. Army and commissioned at Fort Armstrong in Illinois, a
free state.32 Emerson took Dred Scott with him as a personal servant at the
Army post.33 Three years later, the Army vacated Fort Armstrong and
Emerson was transferred to Fort Snelling, near the eventual location of St.
Paul, Minnesota, then a part of the Wisconsin territory.34 Slavery was
forbidden in the territory by the Missouri Compromise.35
Contrary to the facts stipulated in Dred Scott v. Sandford, Emerson was
transferred back to St. Louis in October, 1837, and then again to Fort Jesup in
western Louisiana a month later.36 Although Dred Scott and his wife Harriet
remained at Fort Snelling in the employ of one or more of its officers, they
later made the journey to Louisiana in the spring of 1838.37 After a few

24. Id.
25. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393–633.
26. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 4 (“The Dred Scott decision . . . was the Supreme
Court’s first invalidation of a major federal law.”).
27. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803). Under U.S. law, courts not only apply law, but also play
a role in interpreting law both as a matter of the judicial function and as a matter of judicial
review. Id at 177.
28. There is some debate over whether the facts may have been glossed over or even
fabricated to make a model test case. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 269–76.
29. Id. at 239.
30. Id.
31. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 239–40.
32. Id. at 240.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 244.
35. Id.
36. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 244–45.
37. Id. at 245.
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months in Louisiana, Emerson requested a transfer to return to Fort Snelling.38
The Surgeon General granted his request, and that fall Emerson traveled with
his new wife, Eliza Irene Sanford, and the Scotts to the Wisconsin Territory.39
In the spring of 1840, Emerson was transferred to Florida where the Seminole
War was still in progress.40 Mrs. Emerson and the Scotts remained behind in
St. Louis.41 After honorable discharge, Emerson returned to St. Louis and then
later to Davenport, a new town in the Iowa territory, where he began to build a
house.42 Soon thereafter, Emerson’s health began to deteriorate.43 Dr.
Emerson died in late December of 1843, leaving behind a wife and infant
daughter.44 Thus began a decade of litigation.45
In 1846, the Scotts filed petitions in the Missouri circuit court in St. Louis,
“summarizing the circumstances of their residence on free soil” and seeking
permission to bring suit against Mrs. Emerson to establish their freedom.46
The case worked its way up and down the state courts. By the early 1850s, the
Scotts’ attorneys were informed that Mrs. Emerson had sold the Scotts to her
brother, John F.A. Sanford, who was then a resident of New York.47
Dred Scott sued Sanford in federal court, asserting his freedom in the form
of an “action of trespass.”48 The federalist framework accounted for the
possibility that citizens of a state may wish to pursue cases in federal court
rather than in the courts of their home state. In order to ensure the primacy of
state courts in cases most relevant to state law or state matters, the Constitution
limited federal jurisdiction to those circumstances where federal resolution of a
case was either necessary or consistent with state comity.49 One such
38. Id.
39. Id. at 245–46.
40. Id. at 247.
41. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 247.
42. Id. at 247–48.
43. Id. at 248.
44. Id.
45. Dr. Emerson left a life estate to his wife and the remainder to his daughter. Id. Although
Emerson had appointed two executors for his will, including Mrs. Emerson’s brother John F.A.
Sanford, the administrator appointed by the court was Alexander Sanford, Mrs. Emerson’s father.
Id. at 248. It is unclear what happened to the Scotts during the next few years, but it is doubtful
that Dr. Emerson conveyed them to John Sanford as stipulated in the facts before the Supreme
Court. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 398 (1856). It seems that the Scotts were
in the service of Mrs. Emerson’s brother-in-law, Captain Bainbridge, until 1846.
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 249.
46. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 250.
47. Id. at 270.
48. Id. at 276.
49. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
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circumstance is known as “diversity jurisdiction,” where the parties are citizens
of different states.50 The Framers recognized that in a case or controversy
between citizens of different states, the state forum of a party’s citizenship
might be a more receptive and favorable tribunal. Since both parties would
presumably wish to try the case in their own state courts, diversity jurisdiction
allows diverse citizens to remove their case to federal court, an ostensiby
neutral forum.
The question before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether Dred Scott
was a citizen of the State of Missouri.51 If he was a citizen of Missouri, then
the federal court would have diversity jurisdiction to hear his case against
Sanford, a citizen of New York.52 If Dred Scott was a slave, then he was not a
citizen and the Court would be unable to hear his case.53 If the federal courts
lacked jurisdiction, the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court would be left
standing, which had decided against the Scotts.54
The precise character of national citizenship and the relationship between
state and national citizenship was an ongoing debate whose terms were cast
against a backdrop of growing sectional crises in the middle decades of the
nineteenth century. 55 Southern spokesmen, often responding to the assertion
that Blacks were entitled the privileges and immunities of citizenship provided
by Article IV of the Constitution, one of the few places where the word
“citizen” was written into the Constitution, developed and advanced a theory
of citizenship in which national citizenship was conditioned upon state
citizenship.56 The implication of this theory was that Blacks in the South could
not claim national citizenship since they were not citizens in those states.
Many Southerners went even further and claimed that Blacks could not be
citizens at all, as understood by the U.S. Constitution, since they were not part
of the sovereign people who founded the nation, and therefore could claim no
Consuls;―to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;
between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different
States;―between Citizens of the same State claiming Land under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
50. Id.
51. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 400 (1856).
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 264.
55. “The nature of citizenship, state and national, and whether it included free Negroes,
remained unsettled issues when the Dred Scott case reached the Supreme Court. . . . the general
tendency was to regard state citizenship as primary, with United States citizenship deriving from
it.” Id. at 71 (internal citation omitted).
56. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
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protection as such under the Constitution.57 This theory blossomed into legal
doctrine under Dred Scott.
In the course of delivering his momentous opinion, Chief Justice Taney
proclaimed that a person of African descent—even if born free in a state that
treated him as a full and equal citizen—was not and could never become a
citizen of the United States.58 In Chief Justice Taney’s opinion, the language
of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States
could not have intended to include the enslaved African race.59 Both
instruments were formed for the benefit and protection of the people of the
United States, those who were “members of the . . . political communities in
the several States.”60 Thus, because the “enslaved African race . . . formed no
part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration[,]” they could not
enjoy the benefit or protection of it.61
Many scholars and commentators express puzzling confusion in their
analysis of what the Dred Scott case means with respect to race. Part of the
confusion stems from the fact that too often this question is framed in terms of
the personal views or moral character of the Chief Justice and his associates.62
The implication seems to be that if we could discover whether Chief Justice
Taney was a racist, then we could know whether or not Dred Scott decision
was an expression of racial bigotry or simply the faithful application of
precedent by an honest jurist. This curious impulse to locate the racial
implications of Dred Scott in the personal beliefs of one man, or even a few, or
in the consequence of the decision for Dred Scott and his family misses the
larger racial context.
There were numerous ways that the Court could have decided Dred Scott
differently on the basis of precedent or finer legal distinctions, under many of
which the Dred Scott decision would have been little more than a forgotten
footnote in history. On the citizenship question, the Court could have decided
that all free Blacks were citizens of the United States, that free Blacks were
citizens of the United States in states that recognized Black citizenship, or that
free born, free Blacks were citizens while slave born, free Blacks were not.63

57. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 72.
58. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404.
59. Id. at 410.
60. Id. at 410–11.
61. Id. at 410.
62. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 560. This impulse is consistent with the dominant
understanding of racism as an individualistic phenomenon. See john a. powell, Structural
Racism: Building Upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791 (2008).
63. A variation of the latter formulation underpins one of the major holdings of the much
praised dissenting opinion of Justice Curtis. Justice Curtis’s much praised dissent would have
freed the Scotts solely on the technical legal ground that the Court could only review the facts in
the plea of abatement in determining the jurisdictional question of Dred Scott’s citizenship.
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In each case the consequence for the Scotts would have been the same:
slavery.64 The Court could have even avoided the citizenship question
altogether by extending and applying the Strader doctrine,65 which would have
deferred to the state courts to decide the Scotts’ status.66 This, too, would have
left the Scotts in slavery.67
Chief Justice Taney opinion ultimately turns less on the territory question
that enflamed the sectional crisis, questions of interstate comity or even the
heated issue of slavery itself. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion, above all, turned
on race. It inscribed a hard race line into the definition of American
citizenship. Whether born free in a state where Blacks enjoyed state

FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 405–07. Since the plea itself established no facts inconsistent
with Dred Scott being a United States citizen, he was entitled to bring suit in federal court. Id. at
407. For Justice Curtis, only free Blacks born in states recognizing them as citizens were also
citizens of the United States. Id. at 407–08. Had the fact that Dred Scott was born in Virginia
been included in the plea of abatement, then Justice Curtis’s reasoning would have left the Scotts
in slavery.
64. During oral argument before the Supreme Court, Sanford’s attorney, Henry Geyer,
carved a subtle distinction between free-born Blacks and slave-born Blacks. He argued that
“citizens of the United States” as understood in Article Three, Section Two (the diversecitizenship clause), of the Constitution were either born to that status (having been born in a free
state) or acquired it by naturalization under federal law or treaty. Slaves who were later
manumitted or discharged from bondage could not, therefore, acquire that status. Id. at 296.
65. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850). The Supreme Court dismissed a claim
for freedom by slave musicians who had been taken into a free state for a brief trip. Id at 93. The
jurisdictional question was basically whether the forum state had the right to apply its own law or
whether it could be compelled to apply the law of another state. Id. at 94. The specific issue
presented was whether the emancipatory effect of the free state’s law would be enforced
extraterritorially by federal power, or whether the slave in returning to the slaveholding state
reverted totally to its jurisdiction. Id. at 93. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion for the Court
enshrined the principle of reversion, a jurisdictional principle which holds that upon return from a
free state, the slave’s status depends upon the law of the jurisdiction to which they returned. See
id. at 94. The slaveholding state then has the option to decide whether slavery reattaches or not.
The Strader decision of 1850 amounted to a form of judicial restraint. It would leave it to the
individual states to determine whether return from a free state results in freedom or a return to
slavery.
66. This seemed to be the initial formulation of the Court. Upon re-argument, however, the
issues of territoriality and citizenship took additional significance, and the Justices felt compelled
to rule on these issues based upon heightened public expectations. FEHRENBACHER, supra note
22, at 306.
67. Initially, the Missouri state courts had decided on behalf of the Scotts. By the time that
the case had risen to the Missouri Supreme Court, the sectional discord had intensified, and the
ideological and political composition of that tribunal abruptly shifted. In 1852, the Missouri
Supreme Court issued a 2–1 opinion that Dred Scott was still a slave. Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo.
576 (1852). Applying Strader, the decision of the state of Missouri would control. Id. at *5
(NEED PAGE NUMBER FROM HARD COPY). This was the substance of Justice Nelson’s
concurring opinion in Dred Scott. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 457–68 (1856)
(Nelson, J., concurring).
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citizenship or under the whip of the plantation South, it made little difference.
All Blacks, whether free or slave, stood on the same ground.68 In short, Dred
Scott is about whether Black people could ever become citizens and members
of the political community.
Although the term “citizen” is Latin in origin,69 the idea of citizenship first
emerged in ancient Greece around 600–700 BCE.70 The Greek conception of
citizenship was understood as active membership of and participation in the
body politic.71 This conception of the citizen was preceded by and contingent
upon the development of the polis, or the Greek city state’s political
community.72 In every human society, people arrange themselves in groups
organized by some common-unity, whether it is religious, ethnic, linguistic,
geographic a combination thereof, or something else entirely. Athens was the
first place that a political community emerged based on the principle of
sharing in the operation of common affairs, as distinctive from other forms of
community organization.73
Membership is the most important good that human beings distribute to
one another in a community.74 Communities of people extend rights and
privileges to members that are not granted to non-members. In that way,
membership informs all other distributive choices: “it determines with whom
we make those choices, from whom we require obedience and collect taxes,
[and] to whom we allocate goods and services.”75 It follows that membership
is prior in importance even to freedom.76 Without membership, no freedoms
will be established, recognized, or protected.
To be part of a political community is not just a distributive matter, it is
also a constitutive matter. The distribution of membership shapes meaning for
both individuals and the community as a collective. The terms and boundaries
of membership delimit how members mutually describe and perceive
themselves and their community, an understanding that is shaped by those who
are excluded. In that way, membership in a community distributes identity.
68. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 342.
69. PAUL BARRY CLARKE, CITIZENSHIP 4 (1994) (pointing out that the term citizen derives
from the Latin word civitas).
70. Id. According to Clarke, the idea of the citizen was first expressed in Athens as a result
of an economic crisis. Solon, the ruler of Athens, promulgated laws that expanded the political
community as an answer to calls for land redistribution and an anti-aristocratic movement. Id. at
5–6. Orlando Patterson gives a much richer account, see ORLANDO PATTERSON, FREEDOM IN
THE MAKING OF WESTERN CULTURE, 72–77 (1991).
71. CLARKE, supra note 69, at 4.
72. Id. at 4.
73. See id. at 5–6.
74. Id. at 6.
75. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31 (1983).
76. See generally john a. powell, The Needs of Members in a Legitimate Democratic State,
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 969 (2004).
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To be denied membership in a community is to be denied personhood by the
community. Even tribal societies have membership, and being an alien to that
community is a dishonor associated with social death.77 When faced with exile
from the polis or death, Socrates took poison rather than be denied
personhood.78
The rise of the nation-state created a new political space for personhood
(and membership) rooted in citizenship. In modern nation-states, the principal
way that the political community is constituted is through the nation unit.
Members under this arrangement are given the status of “citizen.”79
When citizenship was granted universally, based upon liberal notions of the
enlightenment, personhood became a presumption bestowed to all citizens at
birth, and revoked when they failed to live up to that measure. Yet, for most of
that time, personhood was bestowed to limited segments of the populace, those
80
persons considered citizens.

As the expositor of the Constitution, the Supreme Court plays a public and
symbolic role in articulating and policing the meaning and content of
citizenship. In Dred Scott, the Court was constituting or reaffirming a
particular understanding of citizenship and Whiteness. By declaring that Black
people could not be citizens of the United States, it constituted citizenship as a
salient feature of Whiteness and vice versa. In a sense, Chief Justice Taney
and his brethren were active participants in the social construction of White
identity.81 Being White meant that you could become part of the political
community.
From the outset, American nationality contained a racial component. The
Declaration of Independence’s claim that “all men are created equal” was
anything but self-evident.82 The term “men” excluded women and slaves. The
Naturalization Act of 1790 restricted U.S. citizenship to “free White

77. See PATTERSON, supra note 70, at 13 (discussing the Tupinamba of pre-European South
America).
78. CLARKE, supra note 69, at 7.
79. As John Rawls describes: “Since ancient Greece, both in philosophy and in law, the
concept of the person has been that of someone who can take part in, or play a role in, social life,
and hence who can exercise and respect its various rights and duties.” JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS 24 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). This normative construction of personhood has been
predominant in Western history for over two millennia.
80. john a. powell, The Needs of Members in a Legitimate Democratic State, 44 SANTA
CLARA LAW REVIEW 969, 987 (2004).
81. Although we recognize that the categories “White” and “Black” are socially constructed,
we pay little attention as to how they are constructed. The notion that we sort or distribute
benefits and burdens according to natural categories is demonstrably false. We create and
recreate those identities. Here, Chief Justice Taney was an active participant in the construction
of Whiteness.
82. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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persons.”83 For eight decades, only persons that were White could be
naturalized as American citizens. In the final decades of the nineteenth century
and early decades of the twentieth century, there were many court cases
moving the boundary of Whiteness with ramifications for the political
community.84
One way to understand Dred Scott is that it is about membership in our
imagined community.85 More particularly, could free Blacks or slaves be
considered part of this community? Slavery helped shape the identity and
sense of self of all Americans by “render[ing] blacks all but invisible to those
imagining the American community.”86 Segregation under Jim Crow and later
embraced in Plessy was an extension of the same imagining. The division of
membership, of structuring the national community along racial lines is a
legacy we struggle with today. One only need reflect on our hyper-segregated
and highly impoverished urban areas and coincident White suburban enclaves
to see that there is a sense that these communities do not share a common
unity. Residential segregation curtails the experience of community for people
of different races, and is perhaps the most important factor contributing to
racial inequality today. The Civil Rights Movement is essentially an effort to
make a practical and legal claim about membership and the rights that attach to
membership.
When Abraham Lincoln penned the famous words, “Four score and seven
years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived
in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal,” 87

83. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898) (affirming the
“ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory” as a constitutional
mandate); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 223 (1897) (holding that federal jurisdiction was proper
over a United States citizen’s claims against an Indian tribal member when the member’s nation
refused to recognize him and declined jurisdiction); United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 696 (2d
Cir. 1910) (granting naturalization to national from India when the language of the statute
referred to persons of the “White race,” as distinguished from the “black, red, yellow, or brown
races”); In re Mudarri, 176 F. 465, 466 (D. Mass. 1910) (ruling Syrian national was a member of
the “White race” for naturalization purposes); In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002, 1004 (D. Or. 1910)
(holding the same for Turkish national); In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834 (D. Mass. 1909) (holding the
same for Armenian national); Jennings v. Webb, 8 App. D.C. 43, 53 (App. D.C. 1896) (finding
that a son of a former slave was entitled to the rights of inheritance passing among citizens).
85. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). The idea of communities as imagined
originates from Benedict Anderson’s anthropological understanding of nationalism, where a
nation “is an imagined community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF
NATIONALISM 6 (1991).
86. ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 38 (1998).
87. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg
(Nov. 19, 1863).
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Lincoln was harkening back to ideals contained in the Declaration of
Independence, not the Constitution. President Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address
implicitly criticized the Constitution because its incorporation of slavery
contradicted the commitment to liberty and equality.88 According to Chief
Justice Taney, the terms “citizen” and “people” were interchangeable.89 If
Lincoln was to realize the claim to equality announced in the Declaration, it
would mean nothing less than a reconstitution of the “people” in, “We The
People.”90 The Civil War by itself could not accomplish this. Lincoln was
calling for a new Constitution.
II. A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM
Although the events of the Civil War brought an end to slavery as a
legalized, social relation, Taney’s racial theory of citizenship remained
undisturbed as legal precedent. The first post-war Congress took aim at Dred
Scott by legislating the principle of birthright citizenship in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866:
Be it enacted . . . That all persons born in the United States and not subject to
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
91
servitude . . . .

88. It was not simply that the Constitution as expounded upon by Chief Justice Taney
protected slavery and the slave interest in the sectional conflict; many provisions in the original
document were pro-slavery.

Although the word slavery does not appear in the Constitution, many provisions
were included for the purpose of protecting it. The divide over slavery and the
Constitution created a structure in which the states became the primary political
units and retained wide authority over internal matters. As such, the federal
structure, and the limited federal government erected by the Constitution,
“insulated slavery in the states from outside interference . . . .” Article I
temporarily barred Congress from acting to end the importation of slaves. Article
IV, section 2 placed an affirmative duty on free states to return fugitive slaves to
their place of service, drawing even those states that opposed slavery into the
control stratum. Article V prohibited any Amendment seeking to reverse the
bargain that protected the slave trade until 1808. Most importantly, the
Constitution’s Three-Fifth’s Clause ensured that slaveholders led the process of
nation building until the election of Lincoln.
john a. powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 LAW
& INEQ. 355, 363–64 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
89. Id. at 404.
90. CLARKE, supra note 69, at 20.
91. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1991)).
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And although, for one of the first instances in U.S. history, on April 9, 1866,
the United States Congress overrode President Johnson’s veto, lingering
doubts over the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act spurred the two-thirds
majority in Congress to provide an incontrovertible constitutional foundation.92
Two months later, Congress opened its proposed Fourteenth Amendment with
unmistakably anti-Taney language: “All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.”93 It was now absolutely clear that
anyone born in the United States was a citizen thereof. Thus, the Fourteenth
Amendment overruled a key part of Dred Scott and left no constitutional doubt
about it.
The Fourteenth Amendment did more than ensure that former slaves or
descendants of slaves enjoyed the status of national citizenship; it
unequivocally rejected the theory of national citizenship as derivative of state
citizenship.94 The Fourteenth Amendment not only granted and defined
national citizenship, but it also defined state citizenship and the conditions
under which it was acquired. The greatly diminished agency of states in
deciding for themselves who is a citizen is significant. No state could
henceforth bar any American citizen from choosing to become a state citizen.95
A visitor from another state could become a citizen of another state by simply
moving there, irrespective of what other residents of that state may think.
If citizenship is the primary unit of membership in a democratic political
community and if states no longer have a say in deciding who is a member and
who is not, then it is more than simply citizenship that is redefined by the
Fourteenth Amendment; the relationship between the states and the federal
government is restructured as well.96 The following passage from the abstract

92. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 381 (2005).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
94. It is critical that we not mislead here. The notion that state citizenship was primary and
that national citizenship was derivative was not a doctrine advanced by Chief Justice Taney.
According to Taney, national citizenship was created by the Constitution at the time of its
framing. Although the definition of state and national citizenship and the relationship between
the two had not come before the Court until Dred Scott, there was a tendency to regard state
citizenship as primary, even in Northern circles. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Even
Justice Curtis, a son of New England, assumed this view in his often praised dissent. See infra
note 136 and accompanying text. It was not simply that Justice Curtis’s dissent was praised for
its outcome, but it was lauded for the correctness of its legal determinations. This demonstrates,
we think, that the view of states being primary was not a doctrine limited to the South, but with
notable exceptions, generally assumed.
95. Id.
96. CHARLES L. BLACK JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
UNNAMED 24 (1997).
If, being such a citizen of the United States, you live in Texas, then the national law of
this Amendment ordains that you are a citizen of Texas; Texas has nothing to say about
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summarizing the argument of Mr. John A. Campbell, and Mr. J.Q.A. Fellows
on behalf of the plaintiffs in error in the Slaughterhouse Cases, the first
Supreme Court case to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, describes the
transformation with an eloquence that cannot be justly paraphrased:
It had been maintained from the origin of the Constitution . . . that the State
was the highest political organization in the United States; that through the
consent of the separate States the Union had been formed for limited purposes;
that there was no social union except by and through the States, and that in
extreme cases the several States might cancel the obligations to the Federal
government and reclaim the allegiance and fidelity of its members. Such were
the doctrines of Mr. Calhoun, and of others; both those who preceded and
those who have followed him.
....
. . . The doctrine of the “States-Rights party,” led in modern times by Mr.
Calhoun, was, that there was no citizenship in the whole United States, except
sub modo and by the permission of the States. According to their theory the
United States had no integral existence except as an incomplete combination
among several integers. The fourteenth amendment struck at, and forever
destroyed, all such doctrines. It seems to have been made under an
apprehension of a destructive faculty in the State governments. It consolidated
the several “integers” into a consistent whole. Were there Brahmans in
Massachusetts, “the chief of all creatures, and with the universe held in charge
for them,” and Soudras in Pennsylvania, “who simply had life through the
benevolence of the other,” this amendment places them on the same footing.
By it the national principle has received an indefinite enlargement. The tie
between the United States and every citizen in every part of its own
jurisdiction has been made intimate and familiar. To the same extent the
confederate features of the government have been obliterated. The States in
their closest connection with the members of the State, have been placed under
the oversight and restraining and enforcing hand of Congress. The purpose is
manifest, to establish through the whole jurisdiction of the United States ONE
PEOPLE, and that every member of the empire shall understand and appreciate
the fact that his privileges and immunities cannot be abridged by State
authority; that State laws must be so framed as to secure life, liberty, property
from arbitrary violation and secure protection of law to all. Thus, as the great
personal rights of each and every person were established and guarded, a

the matter. Not 10%, not 1%, just nothing. . . . [T]he right to be and to call yourself a
citizen of any State is not a right conferred by that State, but a right bindingly ordained as
a matter of national constitutional law. . . .
This denial to each of the States of the right to choose its own citizens might be looked on
now as just another nail in the coffin of the theory that our States are “sovereign.”
Id.
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reasonable confidence that there would be good government might seem to be
97
justified.

The Post-Civil War Reconstruction Amendments reordered and remade
our Constitution. To refer to this grand trilogy as “Amendments” may imply a
change too modest to describe their function.98 As Jefferson privately feared
toward the end of his life, the experiment begun at the Constitutional
Convention of 1786 came crashing down.99 The Constitution of 1787 was a
constitutional order of state primacy, derivative national citizenship and
limited federal government. The Constitution of 1870 was a constitutional
order of national primacy with derivative state citizenship and a greatly
expanded role for the federal government, drawing into its protection
fundamental liberties and immunities from state interference.
The

97. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 51–53 (1872).
98. Professor Akhil Reed Amar reiterates this point:
The naked constitutional text misleads: A casual reader encounters a Thirteenth
Amendment whose words seem to follow smoothly after the first seven Articles and the
first twelve amendments, in one continuous constitutional tradition linking the Founders
to their twenty-first -century posterity. What the bare text does now show is the jagged
gash between Amendments Twelve and Thirteen—a gash reflecting the fact that the
Founders’ Constitution failed in 1861–65.
AMAR, supra note 92, at 360.
The first eleven amendments to the Constitution were intended to be checks and
limitations upon the government which that instrument called into existence. They had
their origin in a spirit of jealousy on the part of the States, which existed when the
Constitution was adopted. The first ten were proposed in 1789 by the first Congress at its
first session after the organization of the government. The eleventh was proposed in
1794, and the twelfth in 1803. The one last mentioned regulates the mode of electing the
President and Vice-President. It neither increased nor diminished the power of the
General Government, and may be said in that respect to occupy neutral ground. No
further amendments were made until 1865, a period of more than 60 years. The thirteenth
amendment was proposed by Congress on the 1st of February, 1865, the fourteenth on the
16th of June, 1866, and the fifteenth on the 27th of February, 1869. These amendments
are a new departure, and mark an important epoch in the constitutional history of the
country. They trench directly upon the power of the States, and deeply affect those
bodies. They are, in this respect, at the opposite pole from the first eleven. Fairly
construed amendments may be said to rise to the dignity of a new Magna Charta.
Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 124 (Swayne, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
99. Thomas Jefferson perhaps represents the sentiment of ambivalence that haunted
Southern statesmen of the revolutionary generation. Jefferson despised the institution of slavery,
but his livelihood depended upon its continuation. WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S
BURDEN: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES 166 (1974). In his
denunciation of slavery, Jefferson wrote “Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God
is just: that his justice cannot sleep for ever.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA 163 (William Peden, ed., 1955). By the time of the Missouri Compromise, Jefferson
had described the sectional crisis as a “fire bell in the night.” FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at
111.
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Reconstruction Amendments restructured and reconfigured both in fact and in
spirit the relationship between the federal government and the states.
The Constitution, fastened with the Fourteenth Amendment, does more
than strengthen the national hand vis-à-vis the states; it was framed for a new
people. The Civil War and the Civil War Amendments gave birth to a new
freedom but also a new political community. In this sense, the Fourteenth
Amendment does far more than simply amend the Constitution; it is a new act
of constituting by redefining the content of phrase “We The People” in the
preamble in expansive national terms and inclusively without regard to race.100
But granting citizenship as a matter of law and bestowing it as a political
fact is not necessarily the same thing. Indisputably, Blacks could no longer be
denied access to federal courts under the Article III, section 2, diversity of
citizenship clause. But to be free and Black in antebellum America had
actually meant only enjoying a partial freedom by White standards.101 Postbellum declarations of personhood and formal, legal citizenship for freed
slaves would ring false if they were not enforced as a matter of social and
political practice.
According to Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott, the reason that Blacks
were not part of the political community was not simply a function of law, it
was also a function of political culture and social norms. Chief Justice Taney
reasoned that the terms “people of the United States” and “citizens,” terms that
he described as “synonymous,” did not encompass persons of African descent
because they were not members of the “political body” who formed the
“sovereignty” at the moment of constitutional framing.102 Justice Taney’s
legal conclusion turns upon an investigation into the social relations between
the races at the time of the founding. Although he canvasses a raft of legal
instruments, including a probing inquiry into the meaning of the Declaration of
Independence’s assertion that “All men are created equal,”103 an inspection
into the terms of colonial anti-miscegenation laws,104 the language of the
Constitution itself with respect to the enslaved race,105 the laws of the states
after the Revolution but before the framing of the Constitution,106 and further

100. Both elements of are significant. “We The People” now clearly referred to more than the
people of the various states, it unequivocally referred to the people of the United States as a
single, political unit. “We The People” had also been purged, in law, of the race line, the
contradiction between the founding ideals and the long-standing racial order. The national unity
inspired by the war effort—Black soldiering and the moral imperatives that guided that war—
undoubtedly made such an imagined community easier to fathom.
101. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 581.
102. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856).
103. Id. at 410.
104. Id. at 408–09.
105. Id. at 411.
106. Id. at 412–16.
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congressional acts,107 the meaning he imputes to these instruments depends
upon their particular social context:
[Persons of African descent] had for more than a century before been regarded
as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white
race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might
justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and
sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a
profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in
the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals
as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be
open to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and
habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public
108
concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.

Ultimately, for Chief Justice Taney, persons of African descent could not
be citizens because they were regarded by the White race—and not merely by
White governments—as “beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to
associate with the white race.”109 Racial slavery imputed a stigma of “deepest
degradation . . . fixed upon the whole race,” free or slave.110 In short, Taney
argued that social norms themselves were a bar to becoming a part of the
political community. The reasoning of Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred
Scott is rooted in the philosophical and social dimensions of citizenship. If
Congress were to reverse this opinion in a meaningful way, it would require
more than a grant of national citizenship in law, it would require the power to
intervene in the social structures and institutions that shape the meaning of that
citizenship in fact.111
And thus, with the substantive guarantees of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments and the enforcement provisions therein, Congress
sought to overturn Dred Scott not just in law, but in fact.112 The Civil Rights
Acts of 1866113 and 1875114 were clear that Congress was creating
107. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 418–21.
108. Id. at 407
109. Id.
110. Id. at 409.
111. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 34–37 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
elaborated this view in his lone dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, describing the fundamental
transformation of nationhood wrought by the Citizenship Clause. Id.
112. These Amendments not only prohibited slavery, but extended equal protection, due
process, and a right to vote.
113. Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected the right to “enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
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asymmetrical provisions, laws that would reach beyond a narrow view of
public space. In fact, the President vetoed the former, in part, because he said
it went too far, reaching private conduct as well as public action.115
Eventually, the Supreme Court overturned the latter for the same reason.116
The impetus behind these measures was that the restructuring of society was
not simply to occur in the public space conceived narrowly, but that granting
citizenship and membership in fact was to spur change in our social culture.
Accordingly, the Reconstruction program was remarkable for its breadth, a
“blueprint for a social revolution.”117 If there were doubts whether the
Reconstruction Amendments extended only civil rights, those doubts
evaporated with the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment.118 Given the
multiplicity of constitutional Amendments and congressional activity taking
aim at Taney’s opinion, it should not be surprising that Dred Scott has been
called “the most frequently overturned decision in history.”119 Even today that
work remains unfinished. In the 1870s, this project was stillborn.
The unfinished and abortive program of Reconstruction that ended with the
Tilden Hayes compromise was a license for the Court to breathe “new life into
Taney’s racial doctrine.”120 A series of decisions in the 1870s Waite Court
through the end of the century systematically reversed or undermined the
Reconstruction program.121 Three decisions in particular stand out as major
reversals to the architecture of the Reconstruction Constitution. The most
infamous of these judgments was the Plessy v. Ferguson holding that the
doctrine of “separate but equal” protecting a racial caste system was consistent
with Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.122 That decision,
however, was the culmination of decades of retrogression. In 1883, the Court
overturned the Civil Rights Act of 1875 for reaching into the public sphere,

114. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982); Civil Rights
Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
115. ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1863–1877 113 (1990). “His
veto message repudiated both the specific terms of the Civil Rights Bill and its underlying
principle. The assertion of national power to protect blacks’ civil rights, he insisted, ‘violated our
experience as a people.’ . . . Johnson even invoked the specter of racial intermarriage as the
logical consequence of Congressional policy.” Id.
116. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
117. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 581.
118. In 1869, Congress approved the Fifteenth Amendment protecting suffrage for Black
men. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
119. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 580 (quoting RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW
21 (Derrick A. Bell, Jr., ed., 1973)).
120. Id. at 582.
121. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629 (1883); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896).
122. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
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beyond the domain of state action.123 The deep restructuring envisioned by the
Radical Republicans of the Reconstruction Era was being undermined and
systematically reversed. The grant of citizenship was being hollowed out.
However, the arguably most destructive decision had come earlier still.
The overworked Equal Protection Clause dominates the jurisprudence of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and yet, in view of the architects of the
Amendment, it is arguably third in importance. The most important element of
the Fourteenth Amendment was the grant of national citizenship. The second
sentence then lays out substantive prohibitions on state action:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
124
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

If the order of place signals relative importance, then the Privileges and
Immunities Clause is the most important protection afforded under the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is also the only protection that explicitly inheres to
citizens and citizens alone—a fact that could not have escaped the Framers
who bestowed birthright citizenship only a sentence beforehand. The reason
this pivotal phrase escapes the notice of most lawyers and many law students is
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause has been relegated to the
constitutional dustbin, eviscerated in 1877 by the Supreme Court in the
Because of its far reaching implications
Slaughterhouse Cases.125
Slaughterhouse has been described as the worst case in U.S. history. 126
In Slaughterhouse, the Supreme Court first took up the task of interpreting
these words. The plaintiffs claimed that a Louisiana statute regulating the
operation of slaughterhouses violated the privileges or immunities of national
citizenship.127 In rejecting that claim, the Court set out the following analytical
framework: Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment distinguishes between
national and state citizenship.128 The Privileges or Immunities Clause only
protects the privileges and immunities that accrue to national citizenship.129
The question then became: What might those privileges and immunities be?
123. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act reads: “That
all persons within the jurisidiction of the . . . .” Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335,
invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
125. 83 U.S. at 51–55.
126. BLACK, supra note 96, at 55 (1997).
127. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 43–44.
128. Id. at 72, 74.
129. Id. at 74 (holding “it is only [the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United
States] which are placed . . . under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and [the privileges
and immunities of the citizen of the State] are not intended to have any additional protection
by . . . the amendment”).
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Since that question had not yet been determined, the Court began by examining
antebellum case law which previously defined the privileges and immunities of
state citizenship. The Court found these to be basically civil rights of free
men.130 The Court then concluded that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
could not have been intended to transfer protection of these rights to the federal
government because it would be “so great a departure from the spirit and
structure of the institutions.”131 To assuage fears that in so holding the Court
would render the clause meaningless, the Court went onto to enumerate those
things that the clause did protect.132 The Court listed those things that were
already protected by the Constitution before the Fourteenth Amendment or that
were necessary or incident to national citizenship.133 Thus, the Court ignored
the radical transfer that the Fourteenth Amendment undertook and obliterated
the substantive content of the privileges or immunities of national citizenship.
As Justice Field explained in dissent, “[i]f this inhibition . . . refers, as held by
the majority of the court in their opinion, to such privileges and immunities as
were before its adoption specially designated in the Constitution or necessarily
implied as belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle
enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited
Congress and the people on its passage.”134 The Court not only rendered the

130. Id. at 76.
“The inquiry,” he says, “is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities which are fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free
governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by citizens of the several States
which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and
sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would be more tedious than difficult
to enumerate. They may all, however, be comprehended under the following general
heads: protection by the government, with the right to acquire and possess property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such
restraints as the government may prescribe for the general good of the whole.”
Id. (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. Cir. Ct. 371 (1823)).
131. Id. at 78.
132. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 79–81.
133. Justice Miller lists: (1) the right to come to the seat of the U.S. government to assert any
claim he may have upon that government; (2) the right of free access to its seaports, subtreasuries,
land offices, and courts of justice of the United States; (3) the right to demand the care and
protection of the federal government over his life, liberty and property when on high seas or
within jurisdiction of a foreign government; (4) the right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances, the privilege of writ of habeas corpus; and (5) the right of a citizen of the
United States to, by his own volition, become a citizen of any state of the Union by a bona fide
residence therein, with the same rights as any other citizens of that state.
Id. at 79–80. Even if those rights enumerated by Justice Miller are not exclusive or were not
previously protected, they are certainly not of the character that would seem to excite such energy
as to motivate the crafting and passage of such an important Amendment.
134. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
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Privileges or Immunities Clause dead constitutional writ, but it also
understated the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole and its
importance within the Constitution, in effect reversing much of what the
Fourteenth Amendment had attempted to do.
The notion, then, that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to perform
most of the Reconstruction agenda of the Fourteenth Amendment is simply
wrong. It is through the lens of Dred Scott that we come to understand that the
reordering of national identity and citizenship had an important corollary: It
drew those privileges and immunities that had previously been the domain of
state citizenship into the sphere of national citizenship.
It is not just Chief Justice Taney’s racialist vision that was re-inscribed by
the Court in reversing the work of Reconstruction, though this vision has now
been partially repudiated as a consequence of Brown. Chief Justice Taney’s
understanding of dual citizenship was re-inscribed by Justice Miller in
Slaughterhouse, and remains quite lively today.135 It recognizes federal
citizenship while rendering its content empty. Chief Justice Taney’s
concomitant constitutional modus operandi, protecting the worst in a
nationalist model, has been revived as well: It deploys federal grounds to
prevent state and local governments from addressing or remedying racial
harms.
Justice Curtis, in his dissent in Dred Scott, was the constitutional
conservative.
In his view, national citizenship derived from state
citizenship.136 If a state recognized Black citizenship, then it followed that he
or she was also a citizen of the United States. In contrast, Chief Justice Taney
articulated a much broader view of national citizenship in Dred Scott, an
understanding of the Constitution that was anything but deferential to local
government. His ruling barred local governments in the territories from
deciding for themselves whether slavery could be prohibited.137 He also took
away authority of states to make free Blacks citizens and thereby national
citizens. A state, even a slave state, could not make a person of African
descent into a citizen of the United States. To see the handiwork of this mode
of constitutional operation today, one need look no further than the plurality
opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
Dist. No. 1, in which the Court uses the Equal Protection Clause as a bar to
efforts by local school boards to address racial isolation.138
In terms of our jurisprudence, in many respects we have reverted to a preCivil War constitutional understanding and selectively chosen elements of the

135. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 583.
136. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 580–81 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 452–53 (opinion of the Court).
138. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S.
Ct. 2738, 2767 (2007); infra Part III.
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Fourteenth Amendment for enforcement. With the exception of the reversal of
Plessy, the conclusions of Slaughterhouse and the Civil Rights Cases remain
substantially intact. As a consequence, our view of the Fourteenth Amendment
remains unjustifiably narrow.139 Americans of all political persuasions, and
most critically legal advocates, have not fully grasped the fact that we have
two imperfectly realized Constitutions: The pre-Civil War Constitution, where
certainly among other things federalism is robustly embraced, and a post-Civil
War Constitution that gives us, if anything, a different form of federalism and a
different notion of citizenship. The Reconstruction Amendments sought to
remake the Constitution into a new document for a new people. The slippage
that followed the Reconstruction Amendments, especially following the end of
Reconstruction and culminating in Plessy, systematically stripped their content
and undermined their force. Americans inchoately recognize the tension—one
that is often framed in terms of federalism concerns—and struggle to reconcile
a strong, patriotic national identity with a politics that mythologizes states
rights and a limited federal government.
III. NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES
The discordant voices on both sides of the voluntary integration cases in
the Seattle and Jefferson County School Districts illustrate the division
engendered by the post-Reconstruction Supreme Court’s interpretive legacy of
the Fourteenth Amendment set against the clear aspiration of its framers.140
The Court struck down limited race-conscious integration plans as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the
explicit use of racial classifications in student assignment.141 Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for the plurality, distinguishes between segregation that is a
product of state action and segregation that may be the product of residential
housing patterns.142 In the Chief Justice’s view, it is only state-enforced
segregation that triggers the constitutional injury that permits the use of racial
classifications as a remedy.143 Furthermore, Justice Thomas, in his concurring
opinion, describes de facto segregation as being “natural,”144 which can also
result from any number of innocent private decisions, including voluntary

139. Although the Equal Protection Clause is one of the most litigated sections of the
Constitution, it was used more frequently in the late nineteenth century to protect capital interests
rather than descendants of slaves. The Section 2 apportionment provision of the Fifteenth
Amendment has never seen use.
140. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746–50.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 2761.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2773.
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housing choices.145 Consider, in contrast, the language of Justice Breyer’s
impassioned dissent:
[Brown] was a promise embodied in three Amendments designed to make
citizens of slaves. It was the promise of true racial equality—not as a matter of
fine words on paper, but as a matter of everyday life in the Nation’s cities and
schools. It was about the nature of a democracy that must work for all
Americans. It sought one law, one Nation, one people, not simply as a matter
146
of legal principle but in terms of how we actually live.

In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney reasoned that Blacks were not and
could never be citizens because they were not considered worthy, even when
free, by the dominant race. Overturning Chief Justice Taney’s holding that
Blacks were not citizens in law was not enough if the social relations that
underpinned the lived experience of that legal status did not follow with it.
Justice Breyer perceives this distinction when he writes that citizenship must
be more than a matter of “legal principle”; it must speak to us in terms of how
“we actually live.”147 Although the Reconstruction Congress attempted to
enforce this vision with robust proposals reaching into social life, the Court
issued a series of reversals, most prominently in the trio of cases described in
Part II.148 At the very moment that citizenship was now drawn into the federal
sphere, it was suddenly vacuous.149 The Court regarded congressional
attempts to remake social relations as going beyond the bounds of
congressional authority, reaching beyond state action and into the private
sphere.150
This is also, therefore, a debate over the validity and limits of individual
action and private choice. The plurality refuses to prioritize the interest in
creating integrated living and educational environments over the right of White
parents to segregate their children. The dissenting Justices, and Justice
Kennedy in concurrence, would recognize this interest as sufficiently
important to justify racial classifications, so long as they are narrowly
tailored.151 This debate over individual choice is not new. The legitimacy of
Brown was interposed in precisely those terms.
Herbert Wechsler’s famous article on “neutral principles” argued that the
Brown decision could not be grounded in “neutral principles” because there
145. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2769.
146. Id. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
147. Id.
148. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
149. This was a consequence of the Slaughterhouse decision. See supra Part II, notes 74, 92–
96, and accompanying text.
150. This is the message of the Civil Rights Cases. See supra note 116 and accompanying
text.
151. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Id. at 2794–97 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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was no principled basis for choosing African American associational rights to
an integrated education over the right of Southern Whites to not associate with
African Americans.152 He framed the question in terms of two injuries: the
forced segregation of Blacks and the forced integration of Whites. His critique
of Brown went beyond a critique of the famous footnote 11 doll experiment,
which demonstrated the psychological harms of segregation.153 If you could
prove to Wechsler that Blacks were injured by segregation, that evidence
would not have changed his conclusion. Even if you could validate that injury,
there remains another injury consequent from forced integration; and it is not
clear how the Court may choose in a neutral way to prioritize, as a
constitutional matter, one injury over another.
This is the wrong debate because it is the wrong question. The
Reconstruction Amendments were not designed to be neutral. They were
intended to carry certain values about citizenship, membership, and political
identity in the republic. The question of neutral principles is also wrong as a
strict jurisprudential matter. Herbert Wechsler’s critique was framed as a First
Amendment associational question.154 That is a mischaracterization of Brown.
Brown was part of the overthrow of an unequal caste system. The search for
neutral principles assumes symmetry in the relations between Blacks and
Whites. The violence in Cooper belies that notion. While equality as a
principle may be value neutral, the Fourteenth Amendment is not.
The substantive core of the Fourteenth Amendment is a guarantee of equal
citizenship to former slaves and the descendant’s of slaves. The ancient
Greeks understood that the political community was formed to share in the
“good life.” 155 Equality in the political community meant “the opportunity for
full participation as a respected member of the community.”156 At least two
forms of equality were necessary to achieve this end. Arithmetic equality,
“that which is the same and equal in number or dimension,” is context free,
formal equality. 157 Arithmetic equality is recognizable in the principle, “one
person, one vote.” Geometric equality, “when the first stands in the same
relation to the second as the second to the third,” accounts for differing
positions. Where people are differently situated, it would be unjust to treat
them the same. Geometric equality is contextual and results in the greatest
good. Aristotle, who discussed the two kinds of equality at greatest length,

152. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 31–35 (1959).
153. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 n.11 (1954).
154. See Wechsler, supra note 152, at 29.
155. See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Towards a New Equal Protection: Two Kinds of Equality,
12 LAW & INEQ. 381, 384 (1994).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 419–21.
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emphasized the need for both.158 However, when we talk about equality today,
and certainly when the Roberts Court talks about equality, there is an implicit
rejection of the principle of contextual equality, saying that context does not
bear on the constitutional principle.159 Thus, Chief Justice Roberts writes that
“the way to stop discrimination . . . is to stop discriminating”160 implying that
the forced segregation of Linda Brown is equivalent to the forced integration
of Joshua McDonald.
The Reconstruction Amendments were deeply contextual. They sought to
bring those who had been slaves into the political community. The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 speaks explicitly of extending the “same right[s] . . . as
[are] enjoyed by white citizens.”161 The view in the Reconstruction Congress
was that there was an asymmetry between Whites and non-Whites. Although
only one of the three Reconstruction Amendments specifically references
persons of African descent through the mention of race and condition of prior
servitude, the Supreme Court in its earliest review of those Amendments
recognized a “unity of purpose” behind them:162
[I]n the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be called
history, but which are familiar to us all; and on the most casual examination of
the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the
one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and
without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom,
and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions
163
of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.

Under the light of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question of individual
choice, of “innocent private decisions, including voluntary housing choices,”164
may be best understood as a debate over the right to secede from communal
arrangements. The “secessionist impulse” has considerable pedigree in our
political tradition.165 The founding act of the nation, in declaring independence

158. Id. at 421.
159. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2767–68 (2007). The Court ignored at least some contextual differences, for example, the
Chief Justice equated the assignment of school children here with the system of Jim Crow racial
segregation.
160. Id. at 2768.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1991).
162. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67 (1872).
163. Id. at 71.
164. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2769.
165. Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455,
458 (1984).
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from Great Britain, endorsed this proposition with its opening volley.166 The
Civil War again posed the question of whether some members of a political
community could free themselves from that arrangement by seceding. The
outcome of the Civil War resolved this question in favor of President Lincoln’s
theory of national union and against the secessionists.167 In that sense, the
Civil War was a war to save the Union by denying the right to leave as an “act
of autonomous choice.”168 The Civil War marked the repudiation of the
secessionist principle, and the Civil War Amendments gave federal courts a
central role in enforcing the terms of that repudiation.169
Plessy renounced that principle and permitted people who were supposed
to be joined together in community to break those relations through a doctrine
of “separate but equal.”170 It was then that Blacks and Whites ate at different
restaurants, drank from different fountains, traveled in different ends of a bus,
lived in different neighborhoods, were prohibited from marrying, and attended
different schools. Brown re-imposed “communal bonds” between Whites and
Blacks.171 When Whites resisted this arrangement, they did so in primarily
two ways. First, they sought to use freedom-of-choice remedies that would
ostensibly remove the state actor from the equation. Secondly, they withdrew
from the public sphere. Rather than integrate, many Southern school boards
shuttered up. Public pools closed. Public space shrank. Finally, Southerners
argued that the Supreme Court could not tell state actors what to do. In
Cooper, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected both assertions.172 It
unequivocally stated that the supremacy of the Constitution over all state
action was beyond question. But it demanded obedience not simply from the
state, but also from the defiant White community,
De facto segregation is a continuation of the fight over claim for the right
to secede. In Cooper, the Supreme Court rejected the right of the White
community to secede from communal relationship with Blacks through
freedom-of-choice plans. Since the early 1970s, the Supreme Court has moved
away from that position. It has rejected the claim of integration over the right
of Whites to be free from integration plans first in Milliken and up through

166. “When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve
the political bands which have connected them with another . . . .” THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
167. Burt, supra note 165, at 459 n.12.
168. Id. at 458–59.
169. Id. at 464.
170. Id. at 459.
171. Id. at 457.
172. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1958).
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Parents Involved.173 In Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court reversed a
ruling that had ordered cross-district busing with suburban schools to remedy
proven racial discrimination by the Detroit public school district.174 The lower
court based its decision on the fact that Detroit could not desegregate without
an inter-district remedy, and the fact that Whites were complicit in inner-city
school segregation by moving to the suburbs mainly to avoid sending their
children to Detroit schools.175 The Supreme Court ruled that an inter-district
remedy was improper in the absence of evidence of de jure segregation or a
finding that the district boundaries were drawn with the purpose of fostering
segregation.176 Thus, the case became a political redline, slowing momentum
toward school integration and sanctioning White flight, by putting suburbs on
notice that they could develop local school systems with little fear that they
would have to participate in integration plans. In Parents Involved, the Court
raised the bar for school districts attempting to retain and foster integration
within their district by holding that explicit racial classifications must be used
only as a last resort in the absence of de jure segregation.177 This decision
further insulates de facto patterns of neighborhood segregation from the
tampering of local government. The framing of the question as de facto
segregation versus de jure segregation simply draws the line where the Court
will side one way or another in a seemingly neutral way, perhaps in answer to
Herbert Wechsler.
IV. WHAT DEMOCRACY REQUIRES
Five decades since Brown and Cooper, segregation and racial isolation
remain pronounced throughout the country and in many instances are
worsening. In most metropolitan regions, few truly integrated communities
can be found.178 In regions with large African American populations,
segregation is even more extreme.179 Residential segregation (as measured by
the dissimilarity index) declined by more than twelve points between 1980 and
2000 in regions that were less than 5% African American, but this decline was
only six points in regions that were more than 20% African American.180
173. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2759 (2007) (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n.14 (1974); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971)).
174. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974).
175. Id. at 725.
176. Id. at 745.
177. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2773.
178. SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 17–18 (2004).
179. See id.; see also JOHN LOGAN, ETHNIC DIVERSITY GROWS: NEIGHBORHOOD
INTEGRATION LAGS BEHIND 4 (2001), http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/report.html.
180. LOGAN, supra note 179.
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Although neighborhood segregation declined slightly in the 1990s, school
segregation increased. More Black students attended segregated schools in
2003 than in 1988.181 School resegregation for Blacks and Latinos has been a
trend in nearly every large school district since the 1980s.182 In some ways it
is almost as high as apartheid in South Africa.183 Almost 2.4 million students,
or about one in six Black and Latino students, attend a school in which the
student body is 99–100% students of color.184 White students are the most
isolated group of students in the United States.185 White students, on average,
attend a school in which only one in five students are of another race although
they make up less than 60% of the school age population.186 Following a
series of court decisions between 1991 and 1995, school districts across the
nation have been released from court-ordered desegregation mandates even
when resegregation predictably follows.187 Not only does the Fourteenth
Amendment no longer compel integration, but it has been usurped to curtail
voluntary efforts to maintain integrated schools.
In light of these setbacks, a question arises, often in the context of all
Black or historically Black schools or all women’s schools, about whether
students might perform better in those schools. This question complicates the
discussion and suggests that perhaps de facto segregation, under the right
conditions and with proper support, is not such a harmful arrangement.188

181. ANURMINA BHARGAVA, ERICA FRANKENBERG & CHINH Q. LE, STILL LOOKING TO THE
FUTURE: VOLUNTARY K–12 SCHOOL INTEGRATION, A MANUAL FOR PARENTS, EDUCATORS &
ADVOCATES 12 (2008).
182. Id.
183. See the dissimilarity index values in A.J. Christopher, Urban Segregation in Postapartheid South Africa, 38 URBAN STUDIES 449, 452 (2001). See also Barbara Reskin, The
Discrimination System: Race and Public Policy, slide 4 (Jan. 3, 2004),
http://faculty.washington.edu/reskin/; Initiative in Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences,
Brown University & Lewis Mumford Center, University of Albany, American Communities
Project, Metropolitan Racial and Ethnic Change—Census 2000, http://www.s4.brown.edu/
cen2000/data.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
184. BHARGAVA ET AL., supra note 181, at 11.
185. Id.
186. Id..
187. Id. at 7.
188. Justice Thomas, in his concurrence in Parents Involved, made this point:
Add to the inconclusive social science the fact of black achievement in “racially isolated”
environments. See T. SOWELL, EDUCATION: ASSUMPTIONS VERSUS HISTORY 7–38
(1986). Before Brown, the most prominent example of an exemplary black school was
Dunbar High School. Id. at 29 (“[I]n the period 1918–1923, Dunbar graduates earned
fifteen degrees from Ivy League colleges, and ten degrees from Amherst, Williams, and
Wesleyan”). Dunbar is by no means an isolated example. See id., at 10–32 (discussing
other successful black schools); WALKER, Can Institutions Care? Evidence from the
Segregated Schooling of African American Children, in BEYOND DESEGREGATION 209–
26 (M. Shujaa ed., 1996); see also T. SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE
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There is a growing belief that “integration is no longer a viable social policy,
but rather a failed social experiment.”189 At the same time, there is a more
vocal expression of “integration fatigue” among people of color. Many Black
families indicate a preference for places that are recognized as being
welcoming to Blacks and seem less willing than in the past to be integration
pioneers and move into neighborhoods that might be hostile to their
presence.190 These arguments, however, confuse large legal principles with the
question of the appropriate remedy to a legal injury.
There are a number of reasons why marginalized populations perform
better in homogenous schools. In many institutions that are not all Black, there
is a hostile environment or a stereotype threat.191 There remain constant
assaults, subtle and not so subtle, on women and Blacks in heterogeneous
institutions.192 Part of the problem is that what has been understood and sold
as integration has not been genuine integration.193 Even where Black and
White students attend the same school, they are often tracked into separate
classrooms.194 Today, there is a gross overrepresentation of African American
and Hispanic students in the lowest tracks, even after controlling for prior
measured achievement.195 Low-income students of color are seven times as
WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 141–65 (2004). Even after Brown, some schools with
predominantly black enrollments have achieved outstanding educational results. See, e.g.,
S. CARTER, NO EXCUSES: LESSONS FROM 21 HIGH-PERFORMING, HIGH-POVERTY
SCHOOLS 49–50, 53–56, 71–73, 81–84, 87–88 (2001); A. THERNSTROM & S.
THERNSTROM, NO EXCUSES: CLOSING THE RACIAL GAP IN LEARNING 43–64 (2003); see
also L. IZUMI, THEY HAVE OVERCOME: HIGH-POVERTY, HIGH-PERFORMING SCHOOLS IN
CALIFORNIA (2002) (chronicling exemplary achievement in predominantly Hispanic
schools in California). There is also evidence that black students attending historically
black colleges achieve better academic results than those attending predominantly White
colleges. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 364–65 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment (citing sources); see also United States v. Fordice, 505
U.S. 717, 748–49 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct 2738, 2777
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
189. Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CAL. L. REV. 261, 264 (2006).
190. See CASHIN, supra note 178, at 17–18.
191. See, e.g., Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual
Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 808 (1995) (finding
that the existence of a stereotype can impair the intellectual test performance of black students).
192. See, e.g., id.; Steven J. Spencer, Claude M. Steele & Diane M. Quinn, Stereotype Threat
and Women’s Math Performance, 35 J. OF EXPER. SOC. PSYCHOL. 4, 22 (1999) (finding that a
stereotype threat hinders women’s abilities in math classes).
193. For an overview of what genuine integration might look like, see Adams, supra note
189.
194. See Carol Corbett Burris & Kevin G. Welner, Closing the Achievement Gap by
Detracking, 68 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 594, 595 (2005) (stating that many fear detracking and
heterogenous grouping for fear of a “watered-down” curriculum).
195. Id.
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likely to be in lower track classes as middle-income White students.196 Using
the justification of stereotype threats or unfair tracking as a justification to give
up on integration is, in essence, the rationale of the lower court in Cooper that
these students would just be better off under segregation.197 It sends the
message that Whites are going to behave badly, so we are better off just
keeping Blacks out for their own good.
There remain a number of counter-examples. Even though integration has
not been fully realized, there are many places where integration has succeeded
in narrowing the achievement gap. In many of the Southern schools, certainly
Wake County, Blacks perform extremely well. Under the Wake County
integration plan, designed to reduce racial isolation,198 Black passage of
standardized test went from 40% to 80% in the last decade system-wide.199
The only large school system, with a minor exception, that has completely
eliminated the Black-White performance gap is the U.S. military.200 It is one
of our most integrated institutions.201 However, to think of integrated
education in those limited terms is already problematic.
One of the central purposes behind the creation of public schooling in the
United States was to foster good citizenship.202 John Dewey, the great
educator from the early twentieth century, taught that education in a
democracy must improve society, increasing opportunities for students to
escape from the limitations of their socioeconomic environment and “come
into living contact with a broader environment.”203 Because education is a
primary vehicle for defining who we are, both individually and socially, it
breaks down “those barriers of class, race, and national territory which [keep]

196. Rose Sanders & Wythe Holt, Still Separate and Unequal: Public Education More Than
Forty Years After Brown, IN MOTION MAGAZINE, Oct. 20, 1997, http://www.inmotion
magazine.com/forty.html (citing a Rand Corporation study’s findings).
197. See Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp 855, 858, 866 (D.C. Ark. 1956) (agreeing with the
defendant school district that a “hasty integration” would be “unwise, unworkable, and fraught
with danger”).
198. See Sean F. Reardon, John T. Yun & Michal Kurlaender, Implications of Income-Based
School Assignment Policies for Racial School Segregation, 28 EDU. EVAL. & POLICY ANALYSIS
49, 51 (2006).
199. Id.; Alan Finder, As Test Scores Jump, Raleigh Credits Integration by Income, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, at 1 (“In Wake County, only 40 percent of black students in grades three
through eight scored at grade level on state tests a decade ago. Last spring, 80 percent did.”).
200. See generally Consolidated Brief for Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 18–27, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003
WL 1787554 [hereinafter Brief for Becton et al. as Amici Curiae].
201. Id. at 12.
202. Matthew A. Crenson & Benjamin Ginsberg, From Popular to Personal Democracy, 92
NAT’L CIVIC REV. 173, 177 (2003).
203. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF EDUCATION 24 (MacMillan Co. 1938) (1916) (emphasis added).
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men from perceiving the full import of their activity.” 204 Today, we think of
education largely in terms of a private good, a service provided by government
on behalf of taxpayers.205
The true underlying importance of equal and integrated education for all in
our democracy received now waning support in Brown v. Board of Education,
where Chief Justice Warren described public education as “the most important
function of state and local governments,” and “the very foundation of good
citizenship,” enhancing “the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities.”206 The strong rationale for integration in Brown and later in
Grutter was a particular conception of democracy and the role of citizenship in
a democracy.207 As Justice O’Connor wrote on behalf of the Court, “[w]e have
repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students for
work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to ‘sustaining our
political and cultural heritage’ with a fundamental role in maintaining the
fabric of society.”208 This language is a shift in the Court’s focus on the
individual good education fulfills towards a conception of education deriving
its fundamental importance from the fact that it serves the common good.
Even Justice Thomas recognizes a connection between education and the civic
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. In his view, education is a vital
component in securing the “civic, political, and personal freedoms conferred
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”209 The Court in Grutter wrote about
“effective participation” and the legitimacy of our democracy.210 This
democratic element was picked up by Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinion
in Parents Involved: “It is an interest in teaching children to engage in the kind
of cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary to make a land
of three hundred million people one Nation.”211 The need for integration is
greater than ever as we approach a school age population in the United States
where students of color are 45%.212 The military brief in Grutter discusses the
need for diversity as a matter of national security.213
204. Id. at 101.
205. See generally john a. powell, “A New Theory,” in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE
SOUTH TURN BACK? 281 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield, eds.).
206. 347 U.S. 468, 493 (1954).
207. See id.; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (citing Brown, 347 U.S.
at 493; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)).
208. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221).
209. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 (2002) (Thomas, J.,concurring).
210. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
211. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2821 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
212. See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION BY SEX,
RACE AND HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN FOR THE UNITED STATES (April 1, 2000–July 1, 2005)
(reporting that 45% of U.S. children younger than five years of age are children of color).
213. Brief for Becton et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 200, at 13.
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Martin Luther King, Jr., understood that segregation was evil not just
because of what it did to Blacks, but what it did to Whites as well. It “scars the
soul of both the segregated and the segregator. . . . It gives the segregated a
false sense of inferiority, and it gives the segregator a false sense of
superiority.”214 It is not enough that all children learn to read and write. The
challenge we face is the challenge of becoming effective citizens in the most
diverse country in human history. It is small wonder that Justice O’Connor
reasserted the fundamental principle espoused in Brown that “education . . . is
the very foundation of good citizenship.”215 Segregation makes it very
difficult to develop good citizens, White or Black. If we fail at this, the
country fails as a nation. It is an amazing thing that we now tell school
districts in Seattle and Louisville, not only are you not required to integrate
schools, you are not allowed to integrate schools.
As Dewey, Brown, and Grutter understood, education is fundamentally
about citizenship and democracy. The prize at stake is not how well Black
kids learn, but the constitution of White identity and membership. Segregation
undermines the project of community building, and by extension, nation
building. The racial isolation of Whites in separate schools, reinforced by the
lived experience of segregated neighborhoods, creates a sense of separateness
and difference from people of a different color, who do not seem to be a part of
the same community or share the same values. It is not surprising, then, that
Americans live in a cultural climate that emphasizes individual success and
self-interest over the common good; where values such as civility and mutual
respect are displaced by excessive individualism.
As Blacks in the United States increased their claims to citizenship and the
rights of citizenships, the meaning and substance of citizenship has narrowed.
The grant of national citizenship following the Civil War was a fixed legal
status, but the Reconstruction Amendments gave Congress authority to pass
laws to protect the substance of that status. No sooner had the ink dried on that
document then the fullness of that promise proved illusory. The basic
citizenship privileges and freedoms that were so richly conceived in the
antebellum period evaporated in the wake of Reconstruction. When a second
claim to those rights was advanced during the Civil Rights Movement a
century later, federal courts proved more accommodating. This time public
space itself dissipated as Whites fled, leaving little room for the exercise of
those rights. Today, it is not simply that public space has been shriveling; it
has been under a generation of sustained conservative attack, including calls to

214. Martin Luther King, Jr., “Desegregation and the Future,” Address Delivered at the
Annual Luncheon of the National Committee for Rural Schools (Dec. 15, 1956), in THE PAPERS
OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: BIRTH OF A NEW AGE DECEMBER 1955–DECEMBER 1956 474
(Clayborne Carson et al. eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 1997).
215. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 ).
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privatize education. Robert Putnam attributes a general decline in civic
engagement from the 1960s, which he characterizes a nation in which its
citizens are “increasingly solitary and mutually mistrustful,” to television and
generational change.216 The more obvious explanation is the changing nature
of the community to which Blacks have made a claim for full membership.
Rather than accommodate those claims, Whites moved into exclusive suburbs
in large numbers and retreated into private worlds.
The ancient Greek conception of citizenship as a way of life, as active
participation in governance of common affairs, gave way in time to a very
different concept of citizenship under Roman government.217 This form of
citizenship was a passive legal status, carrying a bundle of rights and imposing
some duties.218 This form of citizenship-as-status was partly a product of
Roman imperial expansion, which was based less on the use of force and more
on granting the status of Roman citizenship to conquered peoples.219 Thus,
dual citizenship emerged—citizenship to the city of birth and to the empire.
However, Roman citizenship was not an empty gesture. Roman citizenship
was a valuable protection that allowed free and unhindered movement across
the empire, protection from foreign and local enemies, and stimulated peaceful
trade.220 Justice Miller’s exposition of the rights and privileges that flow from
national citizenship in Slaughterhouse marks a similar transition. When listing
those privileges and immunities that accrue from the new grant of national
citizenship he lists: “the right to come to the seat of government,” “the right of
free access to its seaport”, “[the right] to demand care and protection of the
Federal government over his life, liberty and property when on the high seas or
within the jurisdiction of a foreign government,” and “[t]he right to use the
navigable waters of the United States.”221 No sooner had citizenship been
nationalized and broadened than the content of that citizenship dramatically
emptied.222
Citizenship is not simply a vertical relationship between individual citizens
and the state. It is primarily a horizontal relationship of citizens to other
citizens in the governance of common affairs. If membership in democracy,
defined as citizenship, is merely a passive status, conferring rights and some
duties, then the meaning of citizenship as active participation in common
governance and membership in the American political community is lost.

216. Crenson & Ginsberg, supra note 202, at 180.
217. CLARKE, supra note 69, at 7.
218. Id. at 8.
219. Id. at 8.
220. Id.
221. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (internal quotations
omitted).
222. See supra note 130.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2008]

LITTLE ROCK AND THE LEGACY OF DRED SCOTT

1187

Citizenship as the “mutual recognition of equals participating in a shared life
and sharing in the operation of their own life” cannot work within the confines
of an atomized, individualized mass society.223 The citizen as a solitary
consumer is a citizen without a civic context. Public education is the chief
domain in which government may hope to instill civic virtues, including the
sense of linked fate and interconnectedness across racial boundaries. In that
context, it is inconceivable that as we move to a more pluralistic, diverse
society that we can have the kind of society we want and need and that the
Reconstruction Amendments and Brown prefigured while we remain separate
and unequal.
CONCLUSION
Brown v. Board of Education has sometimes been referred to as a “Dred
Scott decision in reverse” to connote disdain for activism in the judicial branch
of government.224 There is unintended wisdom in the notion that Brown was
Dred Scott in reverse. Dred Scott transformed the uncertain, ambiguous
character of American citizenship and inscribed in law a definite status of
which persons of African descent could have no part. Brown and her progeny
can be understood as part of the process of reversing that understanding.
In his Pulitzer Prize winning opus on Dred Scott, Don Fehrenbacher
situates the case in the broadest possible American context. After meticulously
tracing the interweaving flow of events, ideas, and actors that lead up to the
infamous decision, he concludes that Dred Scott is “a point of illumination,
casting light upon more than a century of American” law and politics.225 Just
as that history extends backward to the founding and beyond, so does it move
forward, far beyond the confines of the nineteenth and even twentieth
centuries.
From our vantage point, Dred Scott casts a light upon the darkened
shadows of the Fourteenth Amendment and impels us to reclaim our
constitutional legacy. Dred Scott illuminates our constitutional missteps, from
the interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and Enforcement
Provisions to the unjustifiably limited view of constitutional significance we
accord the Reconstruction trilogy. The Fourteenth Amendment was more than
a new amendment. It was a new act of constituting—it was a revised compact
between the states and the federal government that redefined the relationship
between the two.
Brown is, if anything, the framers intended application of the
Reconstruction provisions upon a caste system first instituted in law with
223. CLARKE, supra note 69, at 23.
224. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 593. Dred Scott is often understood as the height of
dangerous judicial activism.
225. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 7.
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slavery and reasserted with shocking vigor under Jim Crow. The promise of
Brown is nothing if not the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment. Where the
Court in Brown spoke in principle and acted sluggishly to enforce its verdict,
Cooper marked an emphatic pronouncement about the supremacy of the
communitarian arrangements and the limits of individual choice. Cooper most
vividly represents the cluster of decisions which, even more than Brown,
rejected the right of secession, the right of Whites to withdraw from communal
relationship. Brown exposed the pernicious fiction of “separate but equal” and
overturned state-sponsored segregation but said little about scheme that would
replace it. It was Cooper and related cases that took a step further and required
integration by denying Whites the freedom to opt out. While many would be
quick to characterize Cooper as a case more about judicial supremacy or
constitutional powers than a statement about the Fourteenth Amendment’s
vision of political community, this is a false dichotomy. It is the exercise of
judicial power and symbolic authority as a response to a claim of a right of
secession that gives full meaning to Cooper.
As the expositor of our Constitution, the Supreme Court is the voice of that
instrument and speaks to a political community defined by that instrument. In
turn, the Court is also a force for re-constituting that community, just as it was
in Dred Scott. A year before the Court’s decision in Cooper, the President had
already sent federal troops into Little Rock to countermand Governor Faubus’s
action.226 No court had ordered this action or had the authority to order the
President to undertake this action.227 Nonetheless, President Eisenhower
clothed his decision in the authority of the Court’s decision in Brown, even
while he went so far as to imply that he personally may have disagreed with
the decision.228 As a practical matter, the Little Rock crisis had already been
resolved. The Court could have simply declined to step in, relying on the
Eighth Circuit decision below229 and the presidential intervention to maintain
the peace and uphold the rule of law. Instead, in a stunning rebuke, the Court
spoke with a “declamatory rhetoric” that left little doubt about its message or
its symbolism.230 To emphasize its point, the Court abandoned the custom of
labeling a single opinion which garners majority support of the Justices as “the
opinion of the Court.” Instead, in Cooper, the Court authored a single opinion
which listed each of the individual Justices by name.231 This served to
underscore both the unanimity of the decision as well as the weight of each
Justice’s strength in support of the opinion. In truth, the Court has no

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Burt, supra note 165, at 475.
Id.
Id.
See Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1958).
Burt, supra note 165, at 475.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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mechanism for enforcing its decision. It must rely upon the executive branch
to execute the law. Although neither the Justices nor the Court itself can
command our devotion, they do command our attention. This is the most
important aspect of the Court’s decision in Cooper. The moral vision of
communal membership reinforced by the boldness of the Court’s action in
responding to the crisis is the spiritual message of the Reconstruction
Amendments. It is a message that we must heed in the turmoil over the
debates over immigration, amidst a cultural climate that favors individualism
and consumerism over mutual respect and civic engagement, at a time growing
resegregation in our neighborhoods and urban areas, and as the United States
moves to a “majority-minority” nation.232 It is a legacy we can no longer
ignore.

232. ANGELA BLACKWELL, SEARCHING FOR THE UNCOMMON COMMON GROUND: NEW
DIMENSIONS ON RACE IN AMERICA 22 (2002) (“It is projected that by the year 2050, the United
States will be nearly a ‘majority-minority’ country, and that the Latino population will exceed all
other minority populations combined.”).
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